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trator should not be allowed to decide it. 155 Third, the arbitrator's experience in a particular field makes him better able to rule on technical
issues than the court. Finally, City of Auburn relieves the court of its
duty to determine threshold questions and, as a calendar-clearing device, is much more palatable than an oppressive ten-day statute of limitations. 156 Nonetheless, the legislature has identified the time-limitations
objection as a threshold one to be decided by the courts upon a timely
application for a stay of arbitration. Particularly in view of the variance
in scope of review between the court's decision and the abritrator's determination, CPLR 7502(b) should not be abrogated by judicial fiat.
CPLR 7503(c): Nonsignatory of arbitrationagreement is not precluded
by the failure to apply for a stay of arbitrationwithin ten days.
The recipient of a properly drafted' 57 notice of intention to arbi58
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trate will be foreclosed from raising certain threshold questions
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This ten-day period has been construed as a statute of limitations. '
Such an interpretation is onerous when applied to a signatory of an
arbitration agreement; if applied to a nonsignatory it would be even
by the Appellate Dimore oppressive. This was the conclusion reached
1 62
Price.
v.
Glasser
in
vision, Second Department,
The petitioners entered into a leasing agreement with the individual respondents, Price, Kligher and Tobin. The contract contained a
clause whereby the parties agreed to arbitrate any and all disputes
arising thereunder. Respondent, Premier Estate Planners, Inc. (Premier), which was not a party to the leasing agreement, notified peti237 N.E.2d
'55 Cf. Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2a 621,
223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968); Agur v. Agur, 32 App. Div. 2d 16, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (2d
Dep't 1969).
156 CPLR 7503(c), as construed in Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills,
Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969).
157 The notice of intention to arbitrate must contain the name and address of the
claimant and must specify the agreement pursuant to which arbitration is sought. Also,
notice must be given the recipient that unless an application is made within ten days
after such service, he will be precluded from raising the "threshold questions." CPLR
7503(c).
158 Under CPLR 7503(c) the threshold questions are: (1) whether a valid agreement
to arbitrate was made; (2) whether it was complied with; (3) whether the claim sought
to be arbitrated is barred by a limitation of time.
159 The recipient may nonetheless present before the arbitrator the objection that
the arbitration is barred by a limitation of time. However, the latter may refuse to
consider it. CPLR 7502(b).
160 CPLR 7503(c).
161 Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d
477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
758, 760 (1970).
102 35 App. Div. 2d 98, 313 N.Y.S.2d I (2d Dep't 1970).
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tioners that their tenancy was being terminated. In response, petitioners served a demand for arbitration on both the individual and the
corporate respondents. When neither recipient moved to stay arbitration within ten days, petitioner moved to compel arbitration. The
lower court ordered the individual respondents to arbitrate but refused
to rule similarly with respect to Premier inasmuch as it was not a party
to the arbitration agreement.
On appeal the appellate division was confronted with a vital question: is a nonsignatory precluded from objecting to the arbitration by
the failure to move within ten days? A similar question had arisen under the CPA. 163 However, the court recognized that the issue before it
had not been decided previously inasmuch as the CPA cases focused
entirely on the casual mode of notice contained in the demand for
arbitration and the due process considerations that were inherent
therein.6 4 Such deficiencies, however, were rectified by the specific
notice requirements contained in GPLR 7503(c). 165 Thus, it could be
presumed that, having cited the ground for censure contained in earlier cases and having acknowledged that objections based on insufficient
notice are no longer plausible, the appellate division would conclude
that the nonsignatory was precluded by its failure to object promptly.
Nonetheless, the court ruled that had such a result been intended by
the legislature, it would have employed the broad term "person" rather
than the more restrictive word "party" in the preclusionary caveat contained in CPLR 7503(c).
It could be argued that because of the notice requirements contained therein, CPLR 7503(c) was designed to encompass nonsignatories as well as signatories of a contract. Otherwise, a person would be
permitted to proceed to arbitration with the defense that he was not a
party to the contract available should the proceedings be going poorly
for him. And, such an alternative is exactly what CPLR 7503(c) is supposed to prevent, namely, the disruptive effect on arbitration when a
party is allowed to raise preliminary defenses at any time.166 Nevertheless, in view of the restrictive interpretations of CPLR 7503(c) con163 See, e.g., Matter of Hesslein & Co. v. Greenfield, 281 N.Y. 26, 22 N.E.2d 149
(1939); Schafran & Frankel v. M. Lowenstein &-Sons, 280 N.Y. 164, 19 N.E,2d 1005 (1939).
164Witness the following statement:
The notice should state where and at what time the party is to proceed and the
consequences of his failure to act as the law specified. We do not say that all
these things are necessary, but we do say that the proceedings for arbitration
cannot be left so vague and uncertain that people may be mulcted in judgment
without being sufficiently warned of their rights.
Schafran & Frankel v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, 280 N.Y. 164, 172, 19 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (1939).
165 See note 157 supra.
166 See FOURTH REP. A-244.
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tamined in JonathanLogan Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc. 167 and
its progeny, 168 judicial alternatives to automatic preclusion are indeed
welcomed.
CPLR 7503(c): Application to stay arbitrationmust be received within
ten days.
Inasmuch as the ten-day preclusionary caveat contained in CPLR
7503(c) has been construed as a statute of limitations, 6 9 there is a great
danger that the right to assert threshold objections to arbitration'7 0 may
be lost by the failure to act promptly. Hence, questions relating to
when the ten-day period begins to run'7 ' and how the requisite special
proceeding 72 is timely commenced 173 are of critical importance to the
practitioner. Unfortunately, the amount of litigation generated by this
section is disheartening. 7 4 The latest issue to become the focal point of
judicial controversy concerns a determination of the last date on which
a timely application for a stay of arbitration can be received by the
party demanding arbitration.
In Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Anness'76 the Supreme Court, New
York County, ruled that service of a notice of petition for a stay of arbitration was effected on the date of mailing-not on the date of actual receipt. The court reasoned that a contrary holding would compel
a party to post his moving papers at least three days before the ten-day
period expired in order to insure timely receipt. And, the court rea167 24

N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969).
168 See, e.g., Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 35 App. Div. 2d 21, 312 N.Y.S.2d 406
(1st Dep't 1970); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d
216, 303 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969) (parties are not permitted to extend the ten-day period by written agreement).
169 Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d
477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969).
170 See note 158, supra.
171 See Monarch Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 32 App. Div. 2d 819, 302 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't
1969); Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moliere, 31 App. Div. 2d 924, 298 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1st
Dep't 1969) (ten-day period begins to run when the notice of intention to arbitrate is
actually received).
172 CPLR 7502(a): "A special proceeding shall be used to bring before a court the
first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy which is not made by motion
in a pending action .. "
173 It has been held that the moving papers cannot be served on a party's attorney.
State-Wide Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d Dep't 1968). But
see Bauer v. MVAIC, 31 App. Div. 2d 239, 296 N.Y.S.2d 675 (4th Dep't 1969). And, it is
generally acknowledged that the three-day time extension under CPLR 2103(b) is inapposite. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 32 App. Div. 2d 819, 302 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't
1969).
174 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 7503(c), supp. commentary at 132 (1970).
175 62 Misc. 2d 592, 308 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 145, 173 (1970).

